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Abstract 
The main objective  was to assess the risk of farmers in the European Union and to analyze the impact of 
agricultural policy changes on the main components of income namely price and production risks. In order to 
achieve this, qualitative considerations and quantitative analyses covering the period 2004 – 2018 have been 
made.  Future  policy  scenarios  have  been  defined,  taking  into  account  likely  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
developments, including possible outcomes of the Doha round of the WTO negotiations. Subsequently, the 
economic impact of policy scenarios in conjunction with a set of prospective risk management instruments for 
the European Union are determined.  
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1  Introduction 
The projected World Trade Organisation (WTO) and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) policy scenarios, has 
created an awareness amongst farmers and policy makers of the need to quantify the altered risk exposure, some 
of which being catastrophic and disruptive, and study the scope for better risk management opportunities. 
In general, it will be impossible to say whether the net effect of the introduction of a new risk management 
instrument  will  increase  or  reduce  either  the  mean  or  the  variance  of  net  returns.  It  depends  on  how  the 
interactions with other risks on the farm and with other risk management instruments work out. All we can be 
sure of is that, if the decisions are taken rationally, the farmer’s utility should not go down and would normally 
remain the same only if he or she found the new instrument unattractive. Thus the merit of adding any risky 
prospect into an existing farm business cannot be assessed without considering the potential impact on the risk-
efficiency  of  net  returns  from  the  whole  portfolio  of  farm-specific  risky  prospects  (including  any  off-farm 
investments  or  income-earning  ventures).  This  is  true  whether  the  added  prospect  is  in  the  form  of  a  new 
production activity, a new policy, or a new risk management instrument. And, in making an evaluation, it is 
necessary to take account of the stochastic dependencies, such as the correlations, between the new activity and 
the existing ones. Therefore the goal of the current research is to study the economic impact of policy scenarios 
in conjunction with a set of prospective risk management instruments for the European Union at farm level. 
In order to achieve this qualitative considerations and quantitative analyses covering period 2004 – 2018 have 
been made. At first, future policy scenarios have been defined, taking into account likely Common Agricultural 
Policy  developments,  including  possible  outcomes  of  Doha  round  of  the  WTO  negotiations.  Results  of 
qualitative analysis have been converted into quantitative values which were a basis for simulations of farm 
incomes with the use of the farm level Monte-Carlo simulation model set up for the purposes of the project. 
Then, simulation results are used as inputs in  a whole-farm model to provide insight into the impact of (new) 
instruments on farm income volatility. 
 
2  Policy scenarios 
Traditional CAP-based market price support measures, including  wide ranging intervention, have played an 
important  role  in  reducing  price  risk  in  EU  agriculture.  The  successive  reforms  (1992,  1999,  2003)  have 
gradually  turned  more  of  this  support  to  direct  payments,  which  from  2006  on  are  mostly  decoupled.  The   2 




Enhanced market access and lower internal prices strengthen the links with world market developments and, in 
general, (have and will) increase the price risk in EU farming. On the other hand, decoupled direct payments 
increasingly insulate farmer’s incomes from production and price variability. Further decreases in institutional 
prices,  limitations  on  intervention  purchases  and  enhanced  external  competition  may  radically  increase  the 
exposure of EU farmers to price risk. Even though world market prices may increase and become less variable as 
a result of farm and trade policy reform, e.g. due to WTO agreement, volatility of EU prices is expected to be 
greater than in a more protective policy environment. 
  
The WTO commitments  mainly set constraints on the  form of CAP support. While the  magnitude of total 
support being delivered to EU agriculture has not changed substantially since the 1990-ies, the forms of the 
support have evolved significantly
2. The CAP reform of 2003 which decoupled most direct payments turning 
them into green box category is deemed to anticipate much of the new targets of the Doha Round. Nevertheless, 
the ultimate outcomes of the Doha round  may potentially put new pressures on the  CAP. In particular the 
withdrawal  of  export  subsidies  and  provisions  within  the  market  access  pillar  may  be  conducive  to  new 
substantial rearrangements in the CAP, affecting some CMOs more than others. 
 
Another driving force influencing future policy choices will certainly be accelerated debate on the EU budget 
and changing public expectations and increasing scrutiny as regards the role and the efficiency of the CAP.  
 
The pattern of agricultural policy changes in a long-term shows a gradual liberalization, which very likely will 
continue in the future. Such assumption was a foundation for the policy scenarios formulation (Table 1). Base 
scenario represents the historic reference reflecting the present policies and market conditions in years 2002-
2004 (Base). Most likely scenario reflects the policies and market situation as expected in 2013 (ML13). It 
assumes continuation of existing (2006) policies, with some minor changes, including 10% modulation of direct 
payments. For the  year 2018 there  were two scenarios constructed,  which refer to probable CAP evolution 
mainly induced by the prospective new WTO deal - Likely A and Likely B, both including further liberalization 
of market policies, full decoupling of direct support and shift of budgetary funds out of the pillar 1, so called 
modulation (LikA18 and LikB18). They differ in terms of the degree of liberalization: LikB18 assumes greater 
reduction in  market price support and in the direct support (20% mandatory  modulation instead of 10% in 
LikB18 and ceiling of 100 thousand EUR of direct payments per farm, compared with no such limits in LikA18). 
In addition to scenarios considered as “likely” also two extreme scenarios for 2018 – Lib18 (a complete removal 
of subsidies for agricultural sector) and Protectionist (return to the Agenda 2000 type of policy) were created for 
comparisons (Pro18). 
 
Table 1: Policy scenarios. 
Year  Scenario  Description 
2004  Base  Historic reference 
2013  ML13  Luxembourg 2003 policy implemented (sugar reform), no substantive policy 
changes, modulation -10% 
2018  LikA18  Higher support level, full de-coupling, mandatory modulation -10% 
  LikB18  Lower support level, full de-coupling, ceiling 100,000 euro, mandatory 
modulation -20% 
  Lib18  Non-tariff market protection measures removed, no direct payments 
   Pro18  Return to "pre-CAP" reform type of policy - stronger market protection 
 
For each time frame in conjunction with future policy scenario a set of specific assumption were made regarding 
prices and yields. 
                                                 
1   See eg. Swinbank A. (2005), Developments in the WTO and Implications for CAP, Conference Paper, 
The University of Reading. 
2   OECD (2005) Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation (to be published in 
July 2007)   3 
Prices of agricultural commodities are determined by applying price projections for the EU and World market 
for  the  years  2007-2016,  the  estimates  of  nominal  protection  coefficient  for  EU  farm  prices  from  PSE 
calculations and the estimates of the impact of liberalization of farm and trade policies world wide on the level of 
World market prices by OECD (2007) and FAPRI (2005). It was assumed that with no change in the CAP the 
internal EU prices would develop in line with the price projections for the EU market presented by OECD-FAO 
(2007) Agricultural Outlook 2007-2016. Partial liberalization of market and trade policy would in a long term 
bring EU prices closer to the World market prices, but the scope of price changes would depend on a commodity 
and the initial distance between the respective prices . In the Liberal (2018) scenario full alignment of EU prices 
with World market prices is expected, whilst in Protectionist scenario it is assumed that prices “return” to the 
pre-reform level (i.e., sugar) or increase above the baseline (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: EU Price change indices for policy scenarios (2005 = 100)  
OECD-FAO (2007) 




















Wheat   118,35  99,3  99,3  99,1  99,1  94,2  109,0 
Coarse grains 
(barley)  104,35  102  102  101  101  96  111 
Corn  130,61  95  95  93,6  93,6  89  103 
Oilseed    251,63  99  99  100  100  95  110 
Potatoes  115  100  100  100  100  95  105 
Sugar-beet  46,72  56  56  56  47  43  100 
 
Future yields level have been determined through extrapolation of past trends in the period 1992-2004 with some 
corrections based on country experts judgement on the pace of technological change, efficiency improvements 
and  other factors in each sector and member state. A simplifying assumption on neutrality of policy scenarios 
for yields level and variability has been made. Thus an adverse effect of decreases in farm support for yield 
improvement is deemed to be counterbalanced by induced improvements in efficiency and technology. Future 
volatility of yields in each policy scenario (as measured by the coefficient of variation) are assumed to be equal 
to that in the base period (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Assumed rates of annual yield increase and yield forecast for selected commodities. 




Rate of increase  2,0%  0,9%  1,3%  2,0%  2,0%  0,5% 
Mean 2002-2004  38,4  24,5  31,7  189,3  427,0  23,5 
Poland 
2018  50,7  27,8  38,0  249,8  563,4  25,2 
Rate of increase  1,5%  2,0%  1,5%  1,5%  2,6%  1,0% 
Mean 2002-2004  37,6  20,7  31,7  183,3  418,3  19,5 
Hungary 
2018  46,3  27,3  39,0  225,8  599,2  22,5 
Rate of increase  1,5%  2,0%  2,0%  1,8%  1,8%  . 
Mean 2002-2004  29,9  17,3  29,5  276,3  669,7  . 
Spain 
2018  36,8  22,9  39,0  354,7  589,7  . 
Rate of increase  0,5%  1,0%  1,0%  1,0%  1,0%  0,5% 
Mean 2002-2004  84,8  49,3  59,9  438,7  611,7  . 
Nether-
lands 
2018  90,9  56,7  68,9  504,2  703,1  . 
Rate of increase  1,5%  1,9%  1,33%  3,0%  1,2%  2,2% 
Mean 2002-2004  71,9  51,5  57,4  398,3  577,3  33,5 
Germany 
2018  89,0  67,0  69,1  602,4  682,2  45,4 
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3  Whole farm risk programming 
Risky  decision  problems  are  often  handled  by  means  of  portfolio  optimisation.  Portfolio  analysis  for  farm 
planning  requires  the  inclusion  of  the  normal  range  of  risky  production  activities  and  should  comprise  the 
probability distribution of per unit net revenue for each activity and the stochastic dependencies between those 
activities. 
Markowitz (1959) and Freund (1956) showed that quadratic risk programming (QRP) can be used to 
maximise the expected income of a risk-averse decision-maker subject to a set of resource and other constraints 
including a parametric constraint on the variance of income. The model can also be formulated to minimize the 
variance subject to a parametric constraint on expected income, or to expected constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) utility maximization with parametric variation in absolute risk aversion. All three should give identical 
solutions.  
QRP restrictively uses the first two moments (i.e. mean and variance) of each risky activity and the first 
co-moment (i.e. covariance) between the risky activities. The obtained optimal portfolio with respect to income 
or wealth is usually held to be a reasonable approximation provided that the distribution of income or wealth is 
not very skewed. Note that the activity per unit net revenues may not have to be normal distributed for the 
distribution of farm income or wealth to be more or less normal. Under some particular assumptions, it is exact, 
e.g. when the distribution of income is normal and the utility function is negative exponential (Freund, 1956) or 
when the utility function is quadratic (Anderson et al., 1977). The risky alternatives can subsequently be ranked 
by applying the stochastic efficiency with respect to a function method (SERF). This method allows comparing 
the alternatives in terms of certainty equivalents (CE) over the range of risk aversion of interest. SERF works by 
identifying utility-efficient alternatives for ranges of risk attitudes and can be applied to any utility function. 
As an alternative, a non-parametric risk-programming method is free of distribution assumptions and includes 
the joint distribution by means of so-called “states of nature” (i.e., specific combinations and probabilities of 
possible outcomes). Utility-efficient programming (UEP) is one of the non-parametric methods applied in farm 
portfolio analysis (Hardaker et al., 2004). The UEP is formulated as follows: 
[ ] ( ) r z U p U E , max = , r varied,  (1) 
subject to: 
b Ax £   (2) 
  f Iz Cx = -   (3) 
0 ³ x   (4) 
where:  [ ] U E  is expected utility,  p is vector of probabilities for states of nature (often assumed equi-probable), 
( ) r z U ,  is a vector of utilities of net income where the utility function is defined for a measure of risk aversion, 
r,  A is a matrix of technical coefficient,  x  is a vector of activity levels, b  is a vector of resource stocks, C  is 
a matrix of GMs for S states of nature,  I  is a identity matrix,  z  is a vector of net incomes for each state of 
nature S,  f  is a vector of fixed costs.  
 
The described risk programming model can be augmented to optimize the portfolio of crops grown in the coming 
year, including options to insure a shortfall of the long-term average (in case of yield or revenue insurance) or an 
insurance scheme based on an index.  
The objective of yield insurance is to reduce the fluctuations in income caused by yield variations. Yield 
insurance indemnifies any insured farmer in any year in which yield falls below a specified level (coverage 
level). This strike level is defined as a farm-specific percentage of the expected yield per hectare (Halcrow, 
1949). Crop revenue in case of yield insurance equals:  
C Y Y if Y C Y PInd IP R IR qn qn qn qn qn qn qn qn × < - × × + - = , ) (
 
  (5) 
where IRqn is revenue of crop q in case if insurance applied on farm n; Rqn is observed revenue of crop q on farm 
n, which is calculated as: Rqn=YqnPqn, where Yqn is observed yield of crop q on farm n and Pqn is observed price 
of crop q on farm n; IPqn is insurance premium of crop q on farm n; PIndqn is indemnity price of crop q on farm n 
(indemnity price per unit in Euro per hectare eligible for indemnification which can be established by the farmer 
or can be nominated by the insurance company; in each case always at the beginning of the contract year),  qn Y  
is average yield of crop q on farm n; and C is coverage level.    5 
Insuring revenue of a given  crop implies insuring the product of price and  yield of that crop. For 
revenue insurance it is important to consider the joint distribution of prices and yields. Farm total revenue from 
crops with crop revenue insurance equals (Kaylen et al., 1989):  
C R R if R C R IP R IR qn qn qn qn qn qn qn × < - × + - = ), (   (6) 
where  qn R  is average revenue of crop q on farm n that is calculated as:  n n n P Y R × = . 
Besides indemnity based insurance schemes, also index-based insurance are of interest in the current 
study. In this insurance scheme, the premiums and payouts are based on the weather records of the locality in 
which the insurance is sold (Halcrow, 1949). Payouts to a farmer are triggered if weather, in terms of some 
measurable criterion, is below the certain limits of tolerance. Weather index based insurance would be adapted 
more easily to an area in which one or two weather factors such as precipitation and temperature are generally 
limiting and are highly significant in projecting crop yields (Halcrow, 1949). So any applied index only accounts 
for a certain amount of the weather risk (i.e. basis risk). Basis risk refers to the inadequate stochastic dependency 
between the actual weather risk exposure of the buyer and the outcome of the weather underlying the hedging 
instrument. In term of risk programming, index insurance products can be incorporated by assuming that only a 
certain percentage of observed adverse years are eligible for compensation reflecting the associated basis risk. 
 
4  Results 
Different farming systems per member state were selected for in-depth analysis. Specialised cereals, oilseed and 
protein crop farms (FADN typology 13) were included in the analysis for Hungary, Poland and Spain, whereas 
general field cropping farms (FADN typology 14) were considered for Germany and the Netherlands. Since 
average farm size differs considerably between those member states this was taken into account. 
Constraints and variable costs for the main crops are determined individually for each farming system 
modeled.  Crops considered are  wheat, rye, barley, oats, triticale,  maize, other cereals, potatoes, sugar beet, 
rapeseed and sunflowers. However, not all crops are common in certain regions. For example, rapeseed is hardly 
cultivated in Spain while sunflowers are, whereas the opposite holds for the Netherlands. Specificity of the 
farming system (e.g., possibility of irrigation, quality of soils which is not shown in FADN data, but observed 
crop selection provides some information) as well as normative sources of information are taken into account. 
The joint future performance distribution were derived from a Monte Carlo simulation model which depended 
strongly on the assumptions made as well as the quality of the entry data, largely coming from the FADN 
database.  
 
The pattern of changes in the level of expected farm income across scenarios is similar for the five case farms 
under investigation if expected income is optimised (Table 4). On the long run expected farm incomes increase 
under  protectionist  policy  (Pro18)  but  are  depressed  if  liberalisation  is  assumed  (Lib18).  The  impacts  of 
alternatively policy scenarios on the optimal farm plan (i.e., level of activities) were not substantial. The allotted 
acreage in the farm plan of cash crops such as sugar beet and potato, which were the most profitable cropping 
activities considered, corresponded to the maximum proportion allowed. This is to say when decisions are made 
assuming risk neutrality whereby farmer are not willing to forego a part of the expected income in order to avoid 
the risks associated with the cultivation of these risky cash crops. As a result, general field cropping farming 
systems (FADN typology 14) which farm plan can constitute a relative large proportion of these cash crops have 
a  more  volatile  farm  income  than  specialised  cereals,  oilseed  and  protein  farms  (FADN  typology  13). The 
coefficient of variation as well as the probability of a negative farm income are for the two general field cropping 
case farms considerable. Both effects originate from volatile crop revenues in conjunction with relative high cost 
causing a relative low expected farm income.    6 
 
Table 4: Linear programming results (risk neutral). 
Member  Farm  Farming    Scenarios 
state   size 
1  system 








  30,540  10,803  26,146  20,917  12,863  50,150 
      CV (%)  109  395  210  292  501  104 








  25,425  28,344  29,848  29,360  19,543  34,523 
      CV (%)  57  60  67  72  106  54 








  9,521  -10,583  -6,418  -8,488  -9,288  -7,666 
      CV (%)  529  -492  -946  -716  -654  -833 








  18,567  21,051  21,553  21,117  13,871  23,604 
      CV (%)  24  24  25  26  39  25 








  18,411  13,716  14,881  12,669  2,712  19,150 
      CV (%)  42  65  65  76  357  54 
       P<0 (%)  0  5  5  12  39  3 
1 European Size Unit. 
2 Farming systems: 13 = specialised cereals, oilseed and protein farm; 14 = specialised arable farm. 
 
To evaluate the impact of insurance within an optimal farm portfolio context three additional optimizations were 
run. In each optimization only insured activities were considered, being either yield, revenue or index insurance. 
Note that in the current analysis the strike level is set at 80% of the mean, implying a deductible of 20%. The 
risk reducing impact of the three insurance schemes under investigation in terms of CV is presented in Table 5. It 
was assumed that the chance of payments via the index insurance was 75% if actual losses were incurred (i.e., 
basis risk). 
   7 
 
Table 6.3: Impact of alternative insurance options (CV,%). 
Member  Farm  Farming  Insurance  Scenarios 
state   size 
1  system 
2  option  Base  ML 13  LikA18  LikB18  Lib18  Pro18 
Germany  ≥40 and 
<100 
14  No 
109  395  210  292  501  104 
      Yield  100  350  188  267  -46  93 
      Revenue  89  312  166  227  390  82 
      Index  107  378  201  309  488  99 
Hungary  ≥8 and 
<16 
13  No 
57  60  67  72  106  54 
      Yield  51  54  59  65  99  46 
      Revenue  45  48  53  58  86  42 
      Index  54  58  64  69  103  50 
Netherlands  ≥40 and 
<100 
14  No 
529  -492  -946  -716  -654  -833 
      Yield  495  -461  -882  -670  -613  -780 
      Revenue  406  -379  -725  -551  -504  -640 
      Index  499  -477  -926  -699  -638  -815 
Poland  ≥8 and 
<16 
13  No 
24  24  25  26  39  25 
      Yield  20  20  21  22  34  20 
      Revenue  20  20  21  22  32  20 
      Index  23  22  23  24  36  22 
Spain  ≥16 and 
<40 
13  No 
42  65  65  76  357  54 
      Yield  21  34  20  32  28  50 
      Revenue  21  32  20  32  24  50 
      Index  23  36  22  37  30  58 
1 European Size Unit. 
2 Farming systems: 13 = specialised cereals, oilseed and protein farm; 14 = specialised arable farm. 
 
The relevance of insurance contracts in terms of its risk reducing impact can be derived by comparing the CV’s 
obtained with and without insurance. For all case farms and scenarios the revenue-coverage contract was most 
effective, and reduced CV on average by about 22%, followed by yield insurance (-13%) and index insurance (-
5%). The efficacy was more or less independent from the scenario considered. Also the impacts of (alternative) 
insurance contract on the optimal farm plan were not substantial. Obtained results are counterintuitive if efficacy 
of insurance - being either yield, revenue or index insurance - is expressed in terms of its risk reducing impact on 
the  probability  of  negative  farm  income.  The  probability  of  a  negative  farm  income  hardly  reduces  and 
sometimes increases if crops are insured. These results can be explained by the fact that this parameter captures 
the  efficacy  partially.  Extreme  negative  yields  and  revenues  are  indemnified,  but  in  case  of  low  expected 
incomes relative to its variability already moderate adverse years will generate negative farm incomes because of 
the premiums to be paid. In general, from the results it can be seen that the net effect of the introduction of a new 
risk-management  instrument  will  affect  the  variability  of  farm  incomes,  as  theory  suggests.  Of  course,  the 
efficacy can be expressed in alternative means. All we can be sure of is that, if the decisions are taken rationally, 
the  farmer’s  utility  should  not  go  down  and  would  normally  remain  the  same  only  if  he  found  the  new 
instrument unattractive. 
 
The  pure  premiums,  also  referred  to  as  expected  claim  cost  or  actuarially  fair  premium,  for  each  type  of 
insurance given a particular farming system are presented in Table 6. Note that converting the pure premium into 
a gross rate requires the addition of the loading, which is intended to cover transaction costs and allowance for 
contingencies and profit.    8 
 
Table 6: Premium of alternative insurance options (Euro per hectare). 
Member  Farm  Farming  Insurance  Scenarios 
state   size 
1  system 
2  option  Base  ML 13  LikA18  LikB18  Lib18  Pro18 
Germany  ≥40 and 
<100 
14 
             
      Yield  84  103  118  100  47  118 
      Revenue  171  207  265  288  310  237 
      Index  52  65  73  58  61  73 
Hungary  ≥8 and 
<16 
13 
                    
      Yield  44  55  61  63  61  63 
      Revenue  79  91  104  109  114  92 
      Index  22  27  31  31  30  31 
Netherlands  ≥40 and 
<100 
14 
                    
      Yield  76  85  87  89  89  89 
      Revenue  324  345  391  404  407  415 
      Index  49  54  56  57  57  57 
Poland  ≥8 and 
<16 
13 
                   
      Yield  164  187  201  199  180  201 
      Revenue  14  15  16  17  18  17 
      Index  71  81  86  87  86  87 
Spain  ≥16 and 
<40 
13 
                    
      Yield  29  34  38  23  38  38 
      Revenue  31  34  37  34  38  41 
      Index  15  17  19  18  19  19 
1 European Size Unit. 
2 Farming systems: 13 = specialised cereals, oilseed and protein farm; 14 = specialised arable farm. 
 
Levels of pure premiums per hectare differed between case farms and were affected by the alternatively policy 
scenarios. On the long run expected premiums increased under protectionist policies as well as more liberal 
policies. For German and Dutch case farms premiums charged for the revenue-coverage contract exceeded those 
for  yield  insurance  and  index  insurance.  Revenue  insurance  premiums  on  general  field  cropping  farming 
systems, with more volatile cash crops (i.e., price variation), were higher than those on specialised cereals, 
oilseed and protein farms (i.e., relative low variation).  
 
According to the model, the trade off between risk and profit was at a fairly low rate given moderate risk-averse 
decision makers (E,V results are not presented). The optimal expected farm incomes were slightly lower under 
risk aversion than under risk neutrality. Again some counterintuitive results were obtained if the impact of risk 
aversion is expressed in terms of its risk reducing effect on the probability of negative farm income. This can be 
explained by the fact that the expected utility is maximized and not the probability of a negative farm income is 
minimized. Comparing the E,V results with the UEP results showed that there are few differences between the 
two and the differences which do occur are mainly trivial. In general, it was observed, that if a farmer was more 
risk-averse, he was more prone to choose a production plan comprising more less-profitable lower-variance 
crops (wheat instead of potato) compared to the optimal plan achieved. 
 
5  Conclusions and discussion 
From the scenario analysis it can be concluded farm risk exposure differed between the assumed future scenarios 
substantially. The pattern of changes in the level of expected farm income across scenarios is similar for the five 
case  farms  under  investigation.  On  the  long  run  expected  farm  incomes  increase  under  more  protectionist 
policies but are depressed if liberalization is assumed. 
   9 
Yet, the impacts of alternatively policy scenarios on the optimal farm plan were not substantial. The optimal 
farm plan of general field cropping farming systems as well as specialized cereals, oilseed and protein farms is 
marginally altered. The amount of cash crops cultivated - which are characterized by higher but more volatile 
outcomes – is more affected by agronomic constraints rather than future policy scenarios. 
 
Diversification as a risk management tool has its limitations. The analysis of the case-specific trade-off between 
the expected gross margins and risk provided an indication of the efficiency of farm diversification. This is to 
say when decisions are made assuming risk neutrality or moderate risk aversion whereby farmers are not willing 
to forego a part of the expected income in order to avoid the risks associated with the cultivation of more risky 
cash crops. Substantial volatility remains despite prospective risk management instruments considered. Farming 
is in general a risky business since crop yields and prices are relatively volatile in comparison to the expected 
farm income.  
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